Abstract. In this article, we focus on the question of target management resistance and the incidence of subse quent bids. A Poisson count data model is used where the dependent variable represents the number of bids (count) received and the independent variables comprise target management actions and firm specific characteristics. Of the target management actions considered, legal defense and the entry of a white knight are associated with additional bids. With respect to firm specific characteristics, we find that a high initial bid premium deters subse quent bids. Firm size is also significant and has an interesting relationship with the number of bids received. Larger target firms tend to receive more bids; however, the number of bids tails offfor firms with assets exceedng $12 billion.
Introduction
Target managements facing hostile tender offers often resist the takeover attempt by way of litigation and a whole range of anti-takeover measures. This defensive activity has led to some controversy and the formulation of two competing hypotheses. 1 The managerial entrenchment hypothesis essentially holds that in undertaking defensive actions, incumbent managers act in self-interest (to hold on to their jobs/perquisites) and against the interests of stockholders. The stockholder interest hypothesis contends that a diverse body of stock holders are at a competitive disadvantage when confronted with a hostile tender offer. They empower incumbent management to take actions necessary to elicit a fair bid price. It has been shown that when the tender offer fails, the stock price reverts to the pre-contest level (see Bradley et al. (1983) ). In such cases, since target stockholders lose their premium, it could be argued ex post that target management was driven by entrenchment motives. From the stockholders' perspective, target management resistance ought to generate an auc tion that eventually leads to a successful takeover.
In this article, we consider a related but somewhat narrower question. We analyze suc cessful tender offers which almost by definition are wealth enhancing to investors who hold stock in the target firm prior to the public announcement of the first bid. Our sample con sists of target firms where management initially resisted the tender offer but eventually capitulated either to the original bidder or to some other bidder who may have entered the bjdding process. From our sample construction, it should be clear that we have consciously chosen to study those target firms whose managements appear to have been guided by stockholder interest, at least when viewed ex post. Our intention is not to revisit the man agement entrenchment versus stockholder interest hypotheses per se. Rather, conditioned on the premise that target management has acted in stockholder interest, our aim is to study (a) the nature of target management actions that lead to an auction type process and (b) whether an auction is spurred or inhibited by finn specific characteristics that are beyond management's immediate sphere of influence. We b~Jieve that our study contributes to the literature on the effects of target management resistance and may have implications for cor porate policy.
We employ count data methodology in which the dependent variable represents the number of bids after the initial bid (count) received by the target fi.I1ll. 2 For parametric estimation, we assume that our dependent variable follows a Poisson distribution. Furthermore, as esti mates may be sensitive to the choice of model, it is essential to test the validity of the para metric assumptions (see MacKinnon (1992) ). Accordingly, we implement two tests whose results support the Poisson specification for our application.
The mean of the Poisson distribution is a function of a set of independent variables, which comprise both target management actions and firm specific characteristics. Of the target management actions considered, legal defense and the induction of a white knight into the contest are significant and appear to generate further bids. As regards firm specific charac teristics, a high initial bid premium apparently deters third parties from entering the bidding process, and hence is associated with fewer bids. Firm size is also a significant explanatory variable with larger firms receiving more bids. However, by including a size-squared variable we find that beyond a critical point (approximately $12 billion in assets) the number of bids received by the target firm tends to decline. This fmding is interesting since it suggests that in the initial stages, size has information value attracting further bids whereas at higher levels it represents a wealth constraint to bidders.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: In Section 2, we outline the data collec tion procedure and sample characteristics. Section 3 consists of an overview of count data methodology. Our results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 contains concluding remarks.
Data
The sample comprises firms that were targets of tender offers during the period 1978-1985. Target firms were identified from the Schedule 140-1 filings which appear in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) News Digest. A Schedule 140-1 form has to be filed by the bidder with the SEC prior to the commencement of a tender offer. Subsequently, the Wall Street Journal lndex (WSJI) was scanned to pick those firms which resisted the tender offer. In addition, the nature of target management resistance and the outcome of the tender offer were recorded. Our sample consists of 126 target firms which were taken over, within an observation period of 52 weeks.
In this study, the dependent variable represents the number of bids (count) after the ini tial bid received by the target fmn. The following explanatory variables are considered; see Table 1 for details of sample characteristics. 
Target Management Actions
i. Legal Defense takes value 1 if target management responds with a lawsuit; 0 other wise. The choice of this variable is due to the Jarrell (1985) study. Jarrell concluded that target managements appear to take a value maximizing gamble by engaging in legal defensive activity. If the fLling of a lawsuit, or the threat to do so, creates a delay in the tender offer process, this may allow other bidders to enter. On the other hand, if the lawsuit is perceived to be more than a delaying tactic, the original bidder may decide to withdraw the offer and other potential bidders may be similarly deterred. However, given the nature of our sample and the results from the Jarrell study, we expect this variable to have a positive influence on the number of bids received. ii. Real Restructuring takes value 1 if target management proposes some change in the asset structure; 0 otherwise. iii. Financial Restructuring takes value 1 if target mangement proposes some change in the ownership structure; 0 otherwise. The two variables cited above were originally characterized by the Dann and DeAngelo (1988) study. This study strongly indicts target management for entrench ment behavior. If the Dann and DeAngelo findings carry over to our sample, we may observe these type of actions dampening the auction process. However, as previously pointed out, our sample consists of successful tender offers which implies, at least ex post, that management may have been trying to secure the best deal for stockholders. Of course, it is always possible that management may have been actually trying to protect their own interests and gave up the fight on realizing that it was a lost cause. We are therefore neutral as to the effects of proposed changes in asset/ownership struc ture on the auction process.
iv. White Knight takes value 1 if target management invites a friendly third party to enter the bidding; 0 otherwise. 3 Our definition of a white knight resembles that followed by Banerjee and Owers (1992) . This type of management action differs substantially from the type of actions discussed above. By inviting a friendly bidder into the con test, management is signaling that it is prepared to cede at least some control. The entry (or potential entry) of at least one additional bidder is expected to stimulate the auction process.
Firm Specific Characteristics
v. Initial Bid Premium represents the percentage excess of the first hostile bid price over the market price of the firm's stock fourteen working days prior to the tender offer announcement. The idea is to select a time frame that allows for information leakage prior to the public announcement. 4 We expect this variable to exercise a nega tive influence on additional bids. Our reasoning is that third party bidders are likely to be deterred by a high initial bid. This could be due either to a perception that the bidder is overpaying 5 or the bid is preemptive in nature, which by definition should deter subsequent bids. vi. Institutional Holdings percentage serves as a proxy for stockholder independence.
The percentage of institutional holdings to total outstanding stock was ascertained from the Standard & Poors' Stockholder Guide. If institutions play a monitoring role, tar get managements are less likely to engage in overt entrenchment behavior. Also, the presence of a seemingly uncommitted block of stockholders is clearly a plus from the perspective of potential bidders. 6 Accordingly, we expect this variable to have a positive influence on the number of bids. vii. Size represents the total assets of the target firm, in book value terms, in $ (billions).
This information was collected from Compustat/Annual reports. The effect of size on the auction process is not obvious. If capital rationing is a practical reality, then size may operate as a wealth constraint to potential bidders. On the other hand, size may also proxy as an information variable. Tender offers for large firms are likely to receive more media coverage and thereby attract the attention of opportunistic bidders. We therefore include a size-squared variable to capture the potential non-monotonic effect of size on the expected number of bids.
viii. Regulation takes value 1 if either the Federal Trade Commission or the Justice Depart ment intervenes by way of requesting additional information or mounting a court chal lenge to the tender offer; 0 otherwise. We expect regulatory scrutiny to have a negative effect on the auction process.
Methodology
Information on many economic variables appears in the form of a count denoting the num ber of times a phenomenon has occurred. Regression models that fail to explicitly take this characteristic of the dependent variable into account are clearly inefficient. Count data regression models belong to a class of limited dependent variable models in which the depen dent variable, Y;, takes on only non-negative integer values. Recently, such models have been employed in econometric research with such applications as: number of visits to a doctor (Cameron and Trivedi (1986) ), number of patents issued (Hausman et al. (1984) ), number of daily homicides (Grogger (1990) ), number of strikes (Cameron and Trivedi (1990) ). In this article, we employ such a model in the context of the number of takeover bids received by a target frrm after the initial bid. Poisson regression models have been often used as a benchmark for analyzing count data.
The Poisson probability distribution for Y; is Dean and Lawless (1989) propose an adjustment which makes the above test perform better in smnJJer samples. The sample value of this adjusted test statistic is -0.30, which still supports the Poisson model.
Results
The central question that we seek to address in this study is whether target management resistance is associated with setting an auction process in motion. As outlined above, we employ a count data approach to capture the auction element in a takeover contest. A basic but relevant question is whether target stockholders are in fact better off under an auction scenario, i.e. , are additional bids necessarily wealth enhancing?
To lay this foundation , we report the results of a standard event study analysis in Table  2 . We compute cumulative average abnormal returns (CARS) over three event windows: (-5, 60), (0, 60) and (+5, 60) . This is done for the total sample as well as subsamples representing firms that received zero, one, two, three or more bids beyond the initial bid. were estimated from days -150 through -31 relative to the event date. 3. One firm had to be dropped from the original sample due to insufficient data points in the estimation period. The pattern that emerges confirms the intuition that target stockholders are indeed better off receiving more rather than fewer bids. The CARS are highest for the "three or more bids" subsample and lowest for the "zero bids" subsample across all event windows. More over, the mean CARS for subsamples with higher bids is significantly greater than the mean CARS for subsamples with lower bids within each event window. 10 This is verified by a series of "differences in means" t-tests at the referee's suggestion.
The estimation results of the Poisson model are presented in Table 3 . We find that of the target management action variables, legal defense and white knight are significant with positive coefficients (implying more counts) as hypothesized. Legal defense probably works by inducing delay in the process that allows potential bidders to enter. This result broadly comports with the Jarrell (1985) study, which was carried out in the more traditional wealth measurement (excess returns) framework. The white knight variable is strongly significant (p-value = 0.003) . Clearly the entry of a friendly bidder fucilitates the auction process and benefits target stockholders. This finding also complements the recent results reported by Banerjee and Owers (1992) , who show that white knight bidders on average experience negative returns. While a takeover contest is generally not a zero-sum game, we infer that a white knight strategy by target management is successful in bidding up the offer price. The financial and real restructuring variables appear to be neutral in terms of their effect on the number of bids received by target firms.
So far as firm specific characteristics are concerned only the initial bid premium and size variables are significant. The level of institutional ownership and regulatory interven tion apparently do not influence the bidding process. The bid premium coefficient is negative, which implies that a high initial bid premium deters subsequent bids. This result suggests that there may be value to preemptive bidding.
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An interesting result pertains to the relationship between target firm size and the number of bids received. We reiterate our reasoning regarding the size variable as follows: ceteris paribus, an increase in target firm size is associated with fewer bids; the idea being that potential bidders would bump into a wealth constraint. Alternatively, since media coverage of the takeover contest is generally proportionate to target firm size, a larger firm may attract more bids by virtue of being in the public eye. In a sense, subsequent bidders enjoy an informational free ride. As both these effects may be present, we attempt to capture the postulated non-monotonic relationship between size and expected bids by including a size-squared variable along with a size variable.l 2 From Table 3 , we find that both the size and size-squared variables are strongly signifi cant with positive and negative coefficients respectively. This suggests that for smaller firms, the information effect dominates the wealth constraint effect leading to further bids. However, size represents a wealth constraint that operates as a deterrent to additional bids for very large target firms. The information effect for these firms may be muted since they are ex tensively covered by the financial press even prior to the takeover bid.
We investigate the size effect further by simulating the number of additional bids associated with different firm sizes holding other regressors constant at their mean values (refer to Figure 1 ). We observe that for most firms the information effect appears to be predominant. It is possible that the size variable captures more than just information release, via media coverage, about a target firm going into play. For instance, Roll (1988) summarizes the argument regarding the connection between executive rewards and firm size. The managers of the bidder firms may have an incentive for growth, including growth by takeover, even when there is no anticipated gain for their shareholders. This can be an added rationale for larger target firms attracting more bids.
The wealth constraint effect is significant only for firms with total assets exceeding $12 billion, which represent a small proportion of our sample. At first glance, the finding that the wealth constraint kicks in at such a high level is surprising. However, it should be noted that the late seventies and eighties (the period represented by our sample) were characterized by relatively easy access to debt capital for corporate restructuring activity.
Conclusion
In this article we implement a relatively new methodology in the area of corporate finance. We use a count data model to explain the variations in the numbers of bids received by firms whose managements resist takeover. We first confirm using a standard event study approach that there is a positive association between the number of bids received and target stockholder wealth. We find that of the target management actions considered, legal defensive activity and the induction of a white knight are significantly associated with additional bids. Our findings spring from an examination of successful tender offers and may provide policy directions to future target managements, whose intent is to maximize stockholder interest. In a more positive line of inquiry, we also examine various firm specific characteristics and their effect on the auction process. A high initial bid premium seems to preempt fur ther bids. Further, firm size has a non-monotonic effect on additional bids. Except for very large target firms (assets exceeding $12 billion), size is positively associated with addi tional bids.
